COCOANUT GROVE, BOSTON

Box 1514 running card

Box 1521 running card

Aftermath

``The fire spread explosively along combustible decorations at the ceiling line'' - Francis L. Brannigan in Building Construction For the Fire Service, Second Edition

On Nov. 28, 1942, flames raced through the Cocoanut Grove, a popular Boston night club, claiming 492 lives. Even an immediate response by firefighters just down the street was too little too late to avert catastrophe.

According to bostonfirehistory.org:

``In a strange coincidence, at 10:15 p.m., the Boston Fire Department received and transmitted Box 1514, located at Stuart and Carver Streets, located about three blocks from the Cocoanut Grove.

``Upon arrival and investigation, firefighters found an automobile fire on Stuart Street. After quickly extinguishing the fire, a firefighter noticed what appeared to be smoke coming from the Cocoanut Grove.

``As they began to investigate, bystanders ran toward them to report the fire. Upon arrival at the Grove, firefighters found a heavy smoke condition emanating from the entire building, with both patrons and employees escaping from the building.

``At 10:20 p.m., the Boston Fire Alarm Office received Box 1521, Church and Winchester Streets, apparently pulled by a civilian bystander.

``The fire chief at the scene ordered his aide to skip the Second Alarm and request a Third Alarm, via fire alarm telegraph, from Box 1521, which was transmitted at 10:23 p.m., followed by a Fourth Alarm at 10:24 p.m.

``A Fifth Alarm was transmitted at 11:02 p.m.''

The official report on the fire said:

``Upon reaching the night club premises, rescue work was immediately begun by the firemen who had responded to the automobile fire. To facilitate this work, hose lines were introduced to reduce the intense heat.  Shortly after the firemen gained entrance to the premises the fire was controlled and the intense heat was abated.

``The apparatus responding to the five alarms was comprised of twenty-five engine companies, five ladder companies, one water tower, one rescue company and other emergency apparatus.

``The first water delivered on the fire was through the door of the Broadway Lounge on Broadway, by the companies who had discovered the fire while engaged at the small fire in the automobile at Stuart street. Subsequently, water lines were operated on Piedmont street, Broadway and Shawmut street.

``Hose lines were introduced through windows and doors of the main building to the first floor, by way of the Shawmut street entrance to the kitchen, and through the Piedmont street entrances to the Melody Lounge. Ladders were raised on Piedmont street. Shawmut street and Broadway, and vents were opened to permit egress for the fire as well as to provide access for hose streams.  In all, eighteen streams were operated for the purpose of quickly cooling the areas to facilitate prompt rescue work.''

Describing the scene inside the club, the Associated Press reported:

``The flames swept through the highly inflammable decorations as the orchestra leader raised his baton to signal for the National Anthem as a prelude to the Saturday night floor show. Within seconds the crowded night club was a bedlam as screaming women and horror stricken men dashed for exits, tumbling over each other on the jam-packed stairways.

``District Fire Chief William J. Mahoney said that tangled and frightfully burned bodies were found four and five deep and that tables and chairs were scattered and tipped in a shambles among the dead.''

Regarding the aftermath, Wikipedia says:

``The Boston Fire Department investigated possible causes of ignition, the rapid spread of the fire and the catastrophic loss of life. Its report reached no conclusion as to the initial cause of ignition, but attributed the rapid, gaseous spread of the fire to a buildup of carbon monoxide gas due to oxygen-deprived combustion in the enclosed space above the false ceiling of the Melody Lounge.

``The gas exuded from enclosed spaces as its temperature rose and ignited rapidly as it mixed with oxygen above the entryway, up the stairway to the main floor and along ceilings.

``The fire accelerated as the stairway created a thermal draft, and the high-temperature gas fire ignited pyroxylene (leatherette) wall and ceiling covering in the foyer, which in turn exuded flammable gas. The report also documented the fire safety code violations, flammable materials and door designs that contributed to the large loss of life.''